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Abstract
This paper investigates an asymmetric duopoly model with a Hotelling line. We
find that helping a small (minor) firm can reduce both social and consumer surplus.
This makes a sharp contrast to existing works showing that helping minor firms can
reduce social surplus but always improves consumer surplus. We also investigate R&D
competition. We find that a minor firm may engage in R&D more intensively than a
major firm in spite of economies of scale in R&D activities.
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1 Introduction
Common observation suggests that firms in the same industry often differ in their market
conduct and performance. Large and small firms tend to have different features in their
strategies. For instance, it has been believed that small (minor) firms should differentiate
their products from those of major firms because the minor firms do not have any advantage
over the major firms if they do not differentiate their products. Moreover, it is also widely
believed that major firms invest more in R&D. In other words, minor firms invest less in
R&D.1 After all, it is often considered that the market impact of small firms is not so large.
From the view of social welfare, however, it is unclear whether or not those strategic conducts
of small firms are beneficial. Therefore, investigating strategic behaviors of minor firms is
an important research topic in the literature of not only industrial organization but also
management strategy. Using a simple Hotelling model, we consider how a small firm affects
consumer and social surplus and R&D expenditures.
In their pioneering work, Lahiri and Ono (1988) investigate an asymmetric Cournot
duopoly and show that an increase in the cost of an inferior firm improves welfare when
the cost difference between firms are sufficiently large, that is, helping a minor firm reduces
welfare.2 An increase in the cost of the inferior firm reduces its output, and through the
strategic interaction between the firms, the output of the superior firm increases. This
production substitution economizes on total production costs and thus improves welfare.
This result implies that eliminating the inferior firm (minor firm) improves welfare. Wang and
Zhao (2007) show that in both Cournot and Bertrand models with product differentiation,
an increase in the cost of the inferior firm can improve welfare.
Although those studies of asymmetric oligopoly show that enhancing competition can
1 As explained later, it is not always true. Cohen and Klepper (1996) mention counterexamples to this
statement.
2 Zhao (2001) provides a sufficient condition for the proposition. For the applications of this mechanism,
see Lahiri and Ono (1997, 1998). Salant and Shaffer (1999) also provide important welfare implications on
asymmetric Cournot models.
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reduce welfare, enhancing competition improves consumer welfare in all the papers mentioned
above. In contrast to the existing works, we present a situation where helping a minor
firm reduces both social surplus and consumer surplus by incorporating product positions
of asymmetric firms. We show this by using an asymmetric location-price model with a
Hotelling line.3 We find that a decrease in the cost of the inferior firm distorts the product
selection by the superior firm and can reduce both consumer and social surplus.
We believe that investigating the relation between firm heterogeneity and social welfare in
a location model is an important issue because we can investigate several important points
within this framework. First, we can investigate how product varieties (the locations of
firms) in a market are endogenously determined. In other words, we can investigate which
firm produces a mainstream product (locates at a central point). Second, we can investigate
whether these equilibrium product varieties (the locations of firms) are efficient from the
viewpoint of social and consumer welfare. A typical example related to our motivation
is the optimal product positioning strategies of asymmetric firms in the context of retail
outlet locations in the fast food industry (see Thomadsen (2007)). In many cities, both
McDonald’s (the stronger competitor) and Burger King (the weaker competitor) seek optimal
locations. McDonald’s avoids moderate amounts of differentiation while Burger King tries to
differentiate itself, and Burger King is more likely than McDonald’s to choose a suboptimal
location (Thomadsen (2007)). In this case, investigating the efficiency of those location
strategies has the potential to provide an insight on policy for land use and regulation of
zoning.
We also investigate R&D competition between asymmetric firms. The larger the firm,
the greater is the output over which it can apply the fruits of its R&D and hence the greater
its returns from R&D (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). Thus, it is widely believed that major
firms invest more in R&D. In this paper, we show that the minor firm can have a stronger
3 For the equilibrium location under an asymmetric cost structure in the Hotelling model, see Ziss (1993),
Tyagi (2000), Liang and Mai (2006), and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009).
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incentive for R&D. In our model, a decrease in the cost of the minor firm distorts the product
selection of the major firm. This strategic effect can dominate the economy of scale effect
mentioned above, and yields a counterintuitive result, that is, the minor firm can invest more
than the major firm. Although it is widely observed that firms with larger market shares
aggressively invest in R&D, it is also observed that minor firms are not always inactive and
those with small market share engage in outstanding R&D (Cohen and Klepper (1996) and
Rogers (2004)). Our result provides a new insight in the literature of the relation between
firm size and R&D.4
Innovation by Harley Davidson in 1980s may be a typical example in which a minor
firm can have a stronger incentive for R&D. Harley Davidson had only about a 5% share
in the US motorcycle market. In this sense, it was a minor firm. Significant innovation by
Harley Davidson has affected the product positioning of Japanese rivals such as Honda and
Kawasaki and resulted in great success for Harley Davidson (see Reid (1991) and Kitano
(2008)).5
Meza and Tombak (forthcoming) is closely related to our paper. They also discuss an
asymmetric location-price model with a Hotelling line. They discuss three main topics: (1)
endogenous timing of entries (locations), (2) mixed strategies of location, and (3) comparison
between the social optimum and the equilibrium locations. They do not deal with our two
main concerns: (1) the relation among cost difference, consumers and social welfare and (2)
4 Our discussion is quite different from the well-known Arrow effect: a potential entrant obtains greater
value from drastic innovation than an incumbent monopolist. In the Arrow (1962) setting, a potential
entrant and an incumbent monopolist have the same opportunity to achieve a drastic innovation to reduce
their production cost. Before the R&D investment, the incumbent monopolist is more efficient than the
potential entrant. In other words, the entrant’s additional gain from the drastic innovation is higher than
that of the incumbent monopolist although the investment cost is the same for both. By assumption, the
potential entrant has a better opportunity than the monopolist (see also Tirole (1988, Ch.10)). In our model,
however, the firms’ investment technologies are the same. That is, if the investment level of a minor firm is
equal to that of a major firm, the levels of their cost reductions are the same.
5 An older example of a small firm is Tokyo Telecommunications Engineering Corporation (forerunner of
SONY) in the Japanese radio market. It competed with Matsushita (forerunner of Panasonic) and Hayakawa
(forerunner of SHARP). A newer example of a small firm may be Mitsubishi Automobile in the Japanese
electric automobile market. It competes with Toyota and Honda.
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R&D competition among asymmetric firms. Our paper and Meza and Tombak (forthcoming)
are complementary in the sense that one increases the value of the other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 provides the result for consumers and social welfare. Section 4 discusses the levels
of R&D investment, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a linear city along the unit interval [0, 1], where firm 1 is located at x1 and firm 2
is located at 1− x2. Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 ≤ 1− x2. Consumers are
uniformly distributed along the interval. Each consumer buys exactly one unit of the good,
which can be produced by either firm 1 or 2. Let pi denote the price of firm i (i = 1, 2). The
utility of the consumer located at x is given by:
ux =
{ −t(x1 − x)2 − p1 if bought from firm 1,
−t(1− x2 − x)2 − p2 if bought from firm 2, (1)
where t represents the exogenous parameter of the transport cost incurred by the consumer.
For a consumer living at x(p1, p2, x1, x2), where
−t(x1 − x(p1, p2, x1, x2))2 − p1 = −t(1− x2 − x(p1, p2, x1, x2))2 − p2, (2)
the utility is same whichever of the two firms is chosen. We can rewrite (2) as follows:
x(p1, p2, x1, x2) =
1 + x1 − x2
2
+
p2 − p1
2t(1− x1 − x2) .
Thus, the demand facing firm 1, D1, and that facing firm 2, D2, are given by:
D1(p1, p2, x1, x2) = min{max(x(p1, p2, x1, x2), 0), 1},
D2(p1, p2, x1, x2) = 1−D1(p1, p2, x1, x2). (3)
We assume that one of the firms (denoted as firm 2) has a cost disadvantage. Assume
the marginal costs of both firms are c1 = c and c2 = c + d, where c is a positive constant
and d is the cost disadvantage of firm 2.
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The profit functions of the firms are:
pi1 = (p1 − c)D1(p1, p2, x1, x2), pi2 = (p2 − (c+ d))D2(p1, p2, x1, x2).
Consumer surplus and social welfare are written as
CS =
∫ D1
0
(v − p1 − t(x− x1)2)dx+
∫ 1
D1
(v − p2 − t(1− x2 − x)2)dx, (4)
SW =
∫ D1
0
(v − c− t(x− x1)2)dx+
∫ 1
D1
(v − (c+ d)− t(1− x2 − x)2)dx. (5)
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, firm 1 chooses its location x1 ∈ [0, 1/2] (by
symmetry, x1 ≥ 1/2 is equivalent to 1− x1(≤ 1/2)). Observing the location of firm 1, firm
2 chooses its location x2 ∈ [0, 1]. In the second stage, firm i chooses its price pi ∈ [ci,∞)
simultaneously.
3 Result
In this section, we derive the equilibrium locations, profits, consumer surplus, and total
social surplus.
3.1 Locations and profits
First, we investigate a price competition stage. Given the locations of firms, x1 and x2, the
firms face Bertrand competition. Let the superscript ‘B’ denote the equilibrium outcome at
the price-competition stage given x1 and x2. The equilibrium prices are:
pB1 =
 c+ d− t(1− x1 − x2)(1− x1 + x2) if d ≥ t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2),3c+ d+ t(1− x1 − x2)(3 + x1 − x2)
3
if d < t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2),
pB2 =
 c+ d if d ≥ t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2),3c+ 2d+ t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2)
3
if d < t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2).
If d ≥ t(1 − x1 − x2)(3 − x1 + x2), DB1 = 1 and D2 B = 0 (monopoly by firm 1 and firm 2
only serves as a potential competitor). If d < t(1−x1−x2)(3−x1+x2), both firms produce
in the market (DB1 , D
B
2 > 0).
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The resulting profits of the firms are:
piB1 =

d− t(1− x1 − x2)(1− x1 + x2) if d ≥ t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2),
(d+ t(1− x1 − x2)(3 + x1 − x2))2
18t(1− x1 − x2) if d < t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2),
(6)
piB2 =

0 if d ≥ t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2),
(t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2)− d)2
18t(1− x1 − x2) if d < t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2).
(7)
Second, we consider the location choice of firm 2. Given the location of firm 1, x1, firm 2
decides its location.6 Lemma 1 states that the optimal location of firm 2 does not depend on
x1. Henceforth let the superscript‘*’ denote the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome
in the full game.
Lemma 1 For any x1(≤ 1/2), the optimal location of firm 2 is 1 (i.e., x∗2 = 0).
As pointed out by d’Aspremont et al. (1979), to mitigate price competition, firm 2 maximizes
the degree of product differentiation given the location of firm 1.
Third, we consider the location choice of firm 1. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Meza and Tombak (forthcoming)) When the locations are sequentially deter-
mined, the optimal location of firm 1 is:
x∗1 =

0 if d ≤ t,
t−√(4t− 3d)t
3t
if t < d ≤ (29
√
145− 187)t
128
' 1.267t,
1
2
if
(29
√
145− 187)t
128
≤ d.
(8)
6 Note that, if d > t(1− x1)(3− x1), it is indifferent what location is chosen by firm 2.
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The resulting profits of the firms are:
pi∗1 =

(3t+ d)2
18t
if d ≤ t,
8(4t+ 3d+ 2
√
t(4t− 3d))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3d)) if t < d ≤
(29
√
145− 187)t
128
' 1.267t,
d− t
4
if
(29
√
145− 187)t
128
≤ d.
pi∗2 =

(3t− d)2
18t
if d ≤ t,
2(10t− 6d+ 5√t(4t− 3d))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3d)) if t < d ≤
(29
√
145− 187)t
128
' 1.267t,
0 if
(29
√
145− 187)t
128
≤ d.
****************************
Figures 1 and 2 here
****************************
Lemma 2 states that x1 is increasing in d if d > t. A stronger advantage of firm 1 makes
its location closer to the center. This result suggests that the stronger firm is more likely to
choose a central position.
We now briefly mention the mechanism of the result. When the cost asymmetry is not
significant, the standard intuition of d’Aspremont et al. (1979) works; that is, mitigating
price competition between the firms is important for them and the products are maximally
differentiated. When the cost asymmetry of the firms is significant, the price effect does
not work. As pointed out by Ziss (1993), when the cost asymmetry is significant, the
optimal location of the efficient firm is the same point chosen by the inefficient firm because
monopolizing the market is the best choice for the efficient firm.7 The mechanism described
by Ziss (1993) works in our model. Because the follower escapes from the leader after the
location choice by the leader, the optimal location for the leader is the center if the cost
advantage is significant.
7 If the efficient firm locates at a different point, to monopolize the market it must set its price at c2 − α
(α depends on the distance between the firms).
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3.2 Consumer surplus and social welfare
From (6), (7), and Lemmas 1 and 2, we have the equilibrium quantity supplied by firm 1
and the equilibrium prices of the firms as follows:
D∗1 =

3t+ d
6t
if d ≤ t,
2(4t−√t(4t− 3d)
9t
if t < d < (29
√
145−187)t
128 ,
1 if (29
√
145−187)t
128 ≤ d.
(9)
p∗1 =

3t+ 3c+ d
3
if d ≤ t,
27c+ 12d+ 16t+ 8
√
t(4t− 3d)
27
if t < d < (29
√
145−187)t
128 ,
4c+ 4d− t
4
if (29
√
145−187)t
128 ≤ d.
(10)
p∗2 =

3t+ 3c+ 2d
3
if d ≤ t,
27c+ 15d+ 20t+ 10
√
t(4t− 3d)
27
if t < d < (29
√
145−187)t
128 ,
c+ d if (29
√
145−187)t
128 ≤ d.
(11)
****************************
Figure 3 here
****************************
Figure 3 indicates that the sum of the marginal costs (2c + d) is not always correlated
with the equilibrium prices. This property is different from the standard Cournot model
(Salant and Shaffer (1999)).
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Substituting (9), (10), and (11) into (4) and (5), we have the following result.
CS∗ =

v − c− 39t
2 + 18td− d2
36t
if d ≤ t,
v − c− t(229t+ 63d) + 2(37t+ 6d)
√
t(4t− 3d)
243t
if t < d < (29
√
145−187)t
128 ,
v − c− 6d− t
6
if (29
√
145−187)t
128 ≤ d.
(12)
SW ∗ =

v − c− 3t
2 + 18td− 5d2
36t
if d ≤ t,
v − c− t(65t− 9d) + 4(15d− 2t)
√
t(4t− 3d)
243t
if t < d < (29
√
145−187)t
128 ,
v − c− t
12
if (29
√
145−187)t
128 ≤ d.
(13)
Simple calculus yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1 CS∗ and SW ∗ are increasing in d if t < d < (29
√
145− 187)t/128.
An efficiency improvement by firm 2 can harm not only social welfare but also consumer
welfare if the efficiency difference between the firms is significant. We summarize the results
in the following Figures:
****************************
Figure 4 here
****************************
When d is small, maximal differentiation holds. An increase in d increases prices of both
firms and reduces consumer surplus. When t < d < (29
√
145 − 187)t/128, an increase in
d increases x1. A smaller differentiation accelerates competition and reduces prices (Figure
3). A smaller differentiation also reduces the transportation costs of consumers. Both
effects increase consumer surplus and the latter effect increases social welfare. When d ≥
(29
√
145 − 187)t/128, the market is monopolized by firm 1 and firm 2 only serves as a
potential competitor. In this phase, an increase in d increases p1 and reduces consumer
surplus.
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4 R&D competition
In this section, we specify how the ex ante cost difference affects the R&D activities of the
firms. We now consider a situation in which the unit cost of the product for each firm is
determined by its investment. Each firm chooses whether to invest to reduce its production
costs. Through investment, firm i has to incur the fixed cost of the investment F , and it
deterministically reduces its marginal production cost from ci to ci− e, where e is a positive
constant and c1 = c and c2 = c+ d (d > 0).
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously determines whether
to engage in R&D investment. In the second stage, firm 1 chooses its location x1 ∈ [0, 1/2]
(by symmetry x1 ≥ 1/2 is equivalent with 1− x1(≤ 1/2)). Observing the location of firm 1,
firm 2 chooses its location x2 ∈ [0, 1]. In the third stage, firm i chooses its price pi ∈ [ci,∞)
simultaneously.8
Our main concern is whether only firm 2 (ex ante inefficient firm) engages in R&D
investment. To investigate the matter, we examine two cases depending on the value of d:
(i) d ≥ d¯ and (ii) d < d¯, where d¯ ≡ (29√145−187)t/128 is the critical value that leads to the
monopoly of firm 1. As mentioned in the previous section, firm 1 monopolizes the market if
and only if d > d¯. We assume that in the first cases d − e < d¯ is satisfied and that in the
second cases d+ e ≥ d¯ is satisfied. In the first case, firm 1 monopolizes the market if no firm
invests, if both firms invest or only firm 1 invests (if the inequality does not hold, firm 2 does
not engage in R&D investment at all). In the second case, firm 1 monopolizes the market if
only firm 1 invests (if the inequality does not hold, monopolization does not occur at all).
We now consider the first case d− e < d¯ ≤ d. We summarize the case with the following
payoff matrix (I and N indicate ‘invest’ and ‘not invest’ respectively).
8 The timing structure in the first stage is not essential to derive the main result in this section. Even
though we assume that the firms make sequential R&D decisions, the main result does not change.
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Firm 1 / Firm 2 I N
I −F 0
4d− t
4
− F 4d+ 4e− t
4
− F
N pif2 (N, I)− F 0
pif1 (N, I)
4d− t
4
where
pif1 (N, I) ≡
8(4t+ 3(d− e) + 2√t(4t− 3(d− e)))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3(d− e))) ,
pif2 (N, I) ≡
2(10t− 6(d− e) + 5√t(4t− 3(d− e)))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3(d− e))) .
As mentioned earlier, our main concern in this section is whether (N, I) is the unique
equilibrium outcome. We now derive the condition that only (N, I) appears in equilibrium.
After some calculus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that d − e < d¯ ≤ d (the first case). Then (N, I) is the unique
equilibrium outcome if and only if e < F < pif2 (N, I).
If e ≥ pif2 (N, I), (N, I) never becomes the unique equilibrium outcome. Figure 5 describes
the regions where e < pif2 (N, I) is satisfied.
****************************
Figure 5 here
****************************
Proposition 2 states that the incentive of the minor firm for R&D investment can be
stronger than that of the major firm. We explain the intuition in the last paragraph of this
section.
We now consider the second case, d < d¯ ≤ d + e. We summarize the case with the
following payoff matrix (I and N indicate ‘invest’ and ‘not invest’ respectively).
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Firm 1 / Firm 2 I N
I pis2(N,N)− F 0
pis1(N,N)− F
4(d+ e)− t
4
− F
N pis2(N, I)− F pis2(N,N)
pis1(N, I) pi
s
1(N,N)
where
pis1(N,N) ≡
8(4t+ 3d+ 2
√
t(4t− 3d))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3d)) ,
pis2(N,N) ≡
2(10t− 6d+ 5√t(4t− 3d))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3d)) ,
pis1(N, I) ≡
8(4t+ 3(d− e) + 2√t(4t− 3(d− e)))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3(d− e))) ,
pis2(N, I) ≡
2(10t− 6(d− e) + 5√t(4t− 3(d− e)))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3(d− e))) .
After some calculus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that d < d¯ ≤ d + e (the second case). Then (N, I) is the unique
equilibrium outcome if and only if
pis1(N,N)− pis1(N, I) < F < min{pis2(N,N), pis2(N, I)− pis2(N,N)}. (14)
If pis1(N,N)− pis1(N, I) ≥ min{pis2(N,N), pis2(N, I)− pis2(N,N)}, there is no F satisfying (14).
Figure 6 indicates regions where pis1(N,N)−pis1(N, I) < min{pis2(N,N), pis2(N, I)−pis2(N,N)}
is satisfied. In regions (1), (2), and (3) in Figure 6, this inequality is satisfied.
****************************
Figure 6 here
****************************
As we stated in the previous section, when the cost difference d lies on (t, (29
√
145 −
187)t/128), a decrease in the marginal cost of firm 2 (resp. firm 1) is harmful (resp. bene-
ficial) for consumers and social welfare. Nevertheless, it is possible that firm 2 has stronger
incentives for cost-reducing R&D investment. A decrease in cost for firm 2 increases the
13
degree of product differentiation, resulting in an increase in the market share of firm 2 and
increases in the prices. Both effects enhance the profit of firm 2, thus, firm 2 has a strong
incentive for R&D investment for strategic purposes. In contrast, a decrease in the marginal
cost of firm 1 decreases the degree of product differentiation, resulting in an increase in the
market share of firm 1 but a decrease in prices. The former effect increases the profit of firm
1 and the latter decreases the profit of firm 1. Thus, firm 1 has a smaller strategic incentive
for R&D investment than firm 2.
On the other hand, there is an economy of scale in R&D. This is because the benefit of
cost reduction is proportional to its market share, whereas the investment cost F does not
depend on market share. For this economy of scale effect, firm 1 has a stronger incentive for
R&D. The strategic effect mentioned above can dominate this economy of scale effect. This
is why (N, I) can be the unique equilibrium. This result is also in sharp contrast with the
existing result presented in Lahiri and Ono (1999).9
Remark Because of mathematical complexity, we have investigated the R&D competition
with the specific form of investment technologies. To show the generality of our result, we
now present the marginal gains from a marginal cost reduction. The gains are derived by the
partial differentiations of pii (i = 1, 2) with respect to d. The absolute value of each firm’s
partial differentiation presents the significance of the marginal gain from its marginal cost
reduction given the cost difference between the firms, d. To derive the marginal gain, we use
pii (i = 1, 2) in Lemma 2. Simple calculus leads to the following (we ignore the discontinuities
9 The economy of scale effect is common in other R&D literature such as Lahiri and Ono (1999). Our
two strategic elements discussed in the text are quite different from those of existing works and yield our
contrasting result.
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of the profit functions).
∣∣∣∣∂pi∗1∂d
∣∣∣∣ =

3t+ d
9t
if d ≤ t,
4t(4(2t+
√
t(4t− 3d))2 − 9d2)
27
√
t(4t− 3d)(2t+√t(4t− 3d))2 if t < d ≤ d¯,
1 if d¯ ≤ d.
∣∣∣∣∂pi∗2∂d
∣∣∣∣ =

3t− d
9t
if d ≤ t,
t(6d− 5(2t+√t(4t− 3d)))(6d− 7(2t+√t(4t− 3d)))
27
√
t(4t− 3d)(2t+√t(4t− 3d))2 if t < d ≤ d¯,
0 if d¯ ≤ d.
This is summarized in Figure 7 (note that, t is normalized to 1 without loss of generality).
****************************
Figure 7 here
****************************
We easily find that the marginal gain of firm 2 from the marginal cost reduction is larger
than that of firm 1 when t < d < d¯. As mentioned earlier, this property stems from the
relation between the cost difference and the degree of product differentiation.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we use a location model and show that helping the minor firm reduces not only
social welfare but also consumer surplus. In their pioneering work, Lahiri and Ono (1988)
show that helping a minor firm can reduce welfare. However, in their models, a decrease
in costs for the inferior firm increases consumer surplus. Our result makes a sharp contrast
with theirs because we show that helping a minor firm can reduce consumer surplus.
We also discuss R&D incentives of firms. Lahiri and Ono (1999) and Kitahara and
Matsumura (2006) have already stated that the incentive for R&D of the superior firm
(inferior firm) is insufficient (excessive) from the viewpoint of social welfare. However, in
their model, the superior firm has a stronger incentive for R&D than the inferior firm. We
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show that the incentive of the inferior firm for R&D can be larger than the superior firm
when a decrease in the inferior firm’s cost reduces both consumer surplus and total surplus.
This also makes a sharp contrast with the previous results mentioned above.
A cost difference between these firms can appear in various contexts. One important
example is international competition under import tariffs. Another example is in the context
of vertical foreclosure, where a vertically integrated firm faces a smaller input price than
the independent downstream firms. Applying our principle to these contexts remains an
interesting research agenda for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that d ≤ t(1−x1)(3−x1). Differentiating piN2 with respect
to x2, we have:
∂piN2
∂x2
= −(t(1− x1 − x2)(3− x1 + x2)− d)(t(1− x1 − x2)(5− 3x1 − x2) + d)
18t(1− x1 − x2)2 < 0.
Therefore, x2 = 0 is optimal, that is, the optimal location of firm 2 is 1. Suppose that
d > t(1−x1)(3−x1). Any x2 yields zero profits for firm 2, thus any location can be optimal
for firm 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: From Lemma 1 we have x2 = 0. Given this, the profit of firm 1 is:
pi1 =

d− t(1− x1)(1− x1) if d ≥ t(1− x1)(3− x1),
(d+ t(1− x1)(3 + x1))2
18t(1− x1) if d < t(1− x1)(3− x1).
When d ≥ t(1 − x1)(3 − x1), the (local) optimal location of firm 1 is x1 = 1/2. The local
optimum exists if and only if d > 5t/4. When d < t(1 − x1)(3 − x1), the (local) optimal
location of firm 1 is derived by the following first-order condition:
∂pi1
∂x1
=
(d+ t(3 + x1)(1− x1))(d− t(1− x1)(1 + 3x1))
18t(1− x1)2 .
The equation is negative for any x1 ∈ [0, 1/2] if and only if d < t; it is zero when x1 =
(t −√t(4t− 3d))/3t if and only if t ≤ d ≤ 4t/3; it is positive for any x1 ∈ [0, 1/2] if and
only if d > 4t/3. When 5t/4 < d < 4t/3, there are two local optimal locations x1 = 1/2 and
x1 = (t−
√
t(4t− 3d))/3t. For the two cases, the profit of firm 1 is:
pi1 =

8(3d+ 4t+ 2
√
t(4t− 3d))2
243(2t+
√
t(4t− 3d)) when x1 =
t−√t(4t− 3d)
3t
,
d− t
4
when x1 =
1
2
.
The former value is larger than the latter if and only if d < (29
√
145 − 187)t/128. This
implies Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: The optimal location of firm 1
Horizontal: d/t, Vertical: x1
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Figure 2: The profits of the firms
Horizontal: d/t, Vertical: pii (i = 1, 2)
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Figure 3: The equilibrium Prices
Horizontal: d/t, Vertical: p∗i − c
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Figure 4: Consumer surplus and social welfare
Horizontal: d/t, Vertical: CS∗ − (v − c) and SW ∗ − (v − c)
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Figure 5: Parameter range within which pif2 (N, I) > e holds.
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Figure 6: Parameter range within which Proposition 3 holds.
Note:
(1) and (2) pis1(N,N)− pis1(N, I) < pis2(N, I)− pis2(N,N) < pis2(N,N),
(3) pis1(N,N)− pis1(N, I) < pis2(N,N) < pis2(N, I)− pis2(N,N),
(4) pis2(N,N) < pi
s
1(N,N)− pis1(N, I) < pis2(N, I)− pis2(N,N).
23
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 d
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
È¶Πi¶dÈ
¶Π2¶d
¶Π1¶d
Figure 7: The marginal gain from a marginal cost reduction
Horizontal: d, Vertical: |∂pii/∂d| (i = 1, 2).
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